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Animals ferce natura, as a class, are known to be mischievous ; and whoever
keeps such an animal in places of public resort is liable for injuries committed by
it to one who is not himself guilty of negligence and is otherwise without fault.
Whoever keeps a dangerous animal, with knowledge of its dangerous propensities, is liable to one injured thereby, without proof of any negligence or default
in the securing or taking care of the animal. The gist of the action in such case
is the keeping of the animal after knowledge of its mischievous propensities.
The defendant in error was attacked and injured by a buck while in a park
owned by the plaintiffs in error, and into which the public were invited and freely
admitted. The buck, with other deer, was at large in the park; there was no evidence that the buck had attacked others, but the plaintiffs in error had a notice
posted in the park to "Beware of the buck;" there was expert evidence that bucks
were dangerous in the fall of the year, at which season the injury was received:
Hded, that the plaintiffs in error were liable.
It is not competent for the Circuit Court to order a peremptory nonsuit in any
case; but the defendant, at the close of the plaintiff's case, may move the court to
instruct the jury that the evidence introduced by the plaintiff is not sufficient to
maintain the action, and to direct a verdict for the defendant. In considering the
motion the court proceeds upon the ground that all the facts stated by the plaintiff's
witnesses are true, and the motion will be denied, unless the court is of the opinion, that, in view of the whole evidence, and of every inference the law allows to
to be drawn from it, the plaintiff has not made out a case which would warrant
the jury to find a verdict in his favor.
It seems that the opinion of one qualified to speak upon the point of inquiry, as
to the habits of animalsferm nzatur&, is admissible as expert testimony; and if not
admissible as such it is admissible as matter of common knowledge.
In examining the charge of a court for the purpose of ascertaining its correctness in point of law, the whole scope and bearing of it must be taken together. It
is wholly inadmissible to take up single and detached passages and to decide upon
them, without attending to the context, or without incorporating such qualifications
and explanations as naturally flow from other parts of the instructions.
Instructions given by the court are entitled to a reasonable interpretation ; .and,
if the proposition as stated is not erroneous, they are not, as a general rule, to be
regarded as incorrect on account of omissions or deficiencies not pointed "out by
the excepting party. Appellate courts are not inclined to grant a new trial on
account of an ambiguity in the charge to the jury, where it appears that the complaining party made no effort at the trial to have the matter explained.

ERR R to the Circuit Court of the United States, for the North-

ern District of New York.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the court, which was
delivered by
CLIFFORD, J.-Animals fere naturm, as a class, are known to
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be mischievous, and the rule is well settled that whoever undertakes
to keep such an animal, in places of public resort, is or may be
liable for the consequences to a party suffering injury from the
animal, if not the latter is guilty of negligence and is otherwise
without fault. Compensation in such a case may be claimed of
the owner or keeper for the injury, and it is an established rule
of pleading that it is not necessary to aver negligence in the
owner or keeper, as the burden is upon the defendant to disprove
that implied imputation. Cases have often arisen where no such
averment was contained in the declaration, and the uniform ruling has been that the omission constitutes no valid objection to
the right of recovery: May v. Burdett, 9 Q. B. 101. Negligence
was not alleged in that case. Trial was had, and the verdict
being for the plaintiff, the defendant moved in arrest of judgment that the declaration was bad for not alleging negligence or
some default of the defendant in not properly or securely keeping the animal. Attempt was made by very able counsel to support
the motion, upon the ground, that even if the declaration was true,
still the injury might have been occasioned entirely by the carelessness and want of caution on the part of the plaintiff; but Lord
DENMAN and his associates overruled the motion in arrest, and
decided that whoever keeps an animal accustomed to attack and
injure mankind, with knowledge that it is so accustomed, is prima
facie liable in an action on the case at the suit of the person
attacked and injured, without any averment of negligence or default
in securing or taking care of the animal, and the chief justice added,
what it is important to observe, that the gist of the action is the
keeping of the animal after knowledge of its mischievous propensities. Precedents, both ancient and modern, it seems, were cited
in the argument and were examined by the court, and the learned
chief justice remarked, that with scarcely an exception they merely
state the ferocity of the animal and the knowledge of the defendant,
without any allegation of negligence or want of care: Jackson v.
Smithson, 15 Mees. & Wels. 565; Popplewell v. Pierce,10 Cush.
509.
Injuries of a serious character inflicted by a mischievous deer,
which the defendant company kept in their park, were received by
the plaintiff at the time and place alleged, for which she claims
compensation of the company. By the declaration it appears that
the company is the owner and proprietor of the Congress Spring
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at Saratoga, in the state of New York, whose waters have become
celebrated for their medicinal qualities and the source of great gains
and profits to the company. Among other things the plaintiff
alleges that the spring had for a long time been kept open and
accessible to visitors, the public being invited in various forms to
patronize its waters, and that to make it more inviting and attractive
the company had opened in connection therewith an extensive park,
ornamented with fountains, trees, shrubbery and flowers, through
which extensive gravelled walks have been constructed for the use
and comfort of those who resort there to use the mineral waters and
to enjoy the landscape; that the company, in order further to
enhance the attractions of the park, had obtained, and in some
degree domesticated, several wild deer, and among them a large
and powerful buck, with large horns and of vicious character and
habits, which were well known to the defendant company, their
officers and agents, and the residents of the village.
Actual knowledge by the company of the mischievous character
of the animal is alleged by the plaintiff, and she avers that the
vicious animal, on the day named, to wit, the 18th of October
1870, was permitted to run at large in the park, and that she on
that day visited the spring to partake of its waters, and that while
she was peaceably proceeding along one of the walks in the park
she was fiercely attacked by the mischievous buck and greatly
injured, bruised and lacerated, as more fully set forth in the
declaration.
Service was made and the defendant company appeared and
pleaded: 1. The general issue. 2. That the damage and injury
suffered by the plaintiff were occasioned by her own fault in neglecting to obey the rules and regulations of the company. On
motion of the plaintiff a jury was impanelled and the parties went
to trial, which resulted in a verdict and judgment in favor of the
plaintiff. Exceptions were filed by the defendant company, and
they sued out the pending writ of error.
Since the cause was entered here the defendant company has
filed the following assignments of error: 1. That the court, in view
of the evidence, should have directed a verdict for the defendant.
2. That the court erred in admitting the questions to the two witnesses called by the plaintiff as experts. 3. That the court erred
in the instructions given to the jury in respect to the question of
damages.
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Certain animals force naturce may doubtless be domesticated to
such an extent as to be classed, in respect to the liability of the
owner for injuries they commit, with the class known as tame or
domestic animals, but inasmuch as they are liable to relapse into
their wild habits and to become mischievous, the rule is that if they
do so, and the owner becomes notified of their vicious habit, they
are included in the same rule as if they had never been domesticated, the gist of the action in such a case, as in the case of untamed
animals, being not merely the negligent keeping of the animal, but
the keeping of the same with knowledge of the vicious and mischievous propensity of the animal: Whart. on Neg., § 922; Decker
v. Gammon, 44 Me. 327.
Three or more classes of cases exist in which it is held that the
owners of animals are liable for injuries done by the same to the
persons or property of others, the required allegations and proofs
varying in each case: 2 Black. Com. 390, Cooley's ed.
Owners of wild beasts, or beasts that are in their nature vicious,
are liable under all, or most all, circumstances for injuries done by
them; and in actions for injuries by. such beasts it is not necessary
to allege that the owner knew them to be mischievous, for he is
presumed to have such knowledge; from which it follows that he is
guilty of negligence in permitting the same to be at large.
Though the owner have no particular notice that the animal ever
did any such mischief before, yet if the animal be of the class that
is ferce naturce, the owner is liable to an action of damage if it get
loose and do harm: 1 Hale's P. C. 430 ; Worth v. Gilling, Law
Rep. 2 C. P. 2.
Owners are liable for the hurt done by the animal, even without
notice of the propensity, if the animal is naturally mischievous, but
if it is of a tame nature there must be notice of the vicious habit:
Mason v. Keeling, 12 Mod. 332; Rex v. Htuggins, 2 Ld. Raym.
1583.
Damage may be done by a domestic animal kept for use or convenience, but the rule is that the owner is not liable to an action on
the ground of negligence without proof that he knew that the animal was accustomed to do mischief: Vrooman v. Lawyer, 13 Johns.
339; Buxendin v. Sharp, 2 Salk. 662; Gockerham v. Nixon, 11
Ired. 269.
Domestic animals, such as oxen or horses, may injure the person
or property of another, but courts of justice invariably hold, that
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if they are rightfully in the place where the injury is inflicted, the
owner of the animal is not liable for such an injury unless he knew
that the animal was accustomed to be vicious; and in suits for such
injuries such knowledge must be alleged and proved, as the cause
of action arises from the keeping of the animal after the knowledge
of its vicious propensities: May v. Burdett, 9 Q. B. 101 ; Jackson
v. Smithson, 15 Mees. & Wels. 565; Van Leuven v. .yke, 1 N.
Y. 515 ; Card v. Case, 5 0. B. 632 ; Hudson v. Roberts, 6 Exch.
699; .Dearth v. Baker, 22 Wis. 73; Cox v. Burbridge, 13 0. B.
N. S. 437.
It appears by the bill of exceptions that the plaintiff, on the
morning of the day of the injury, entered the park belonging to
the defendant company; that after drinking of the water of the
spring she walked through the grounds, and .that she met the mischievous deer; that he attacked her, goring and striking her with
his head and horns, whereby she was thrown down and greatly
injured, and put to great suffering and expense, as more fully set
forth in her testimony. On her cross-examination she testified
that she had been in the habit of visiting the park to enjoy the
water and the pleasure of the walk; that she had noticed the deer
- at an earlier period, and had often seen them running about on the
lawn; that she had seen persons playing with them on different
occasions, and that she had noticed the signboard posted in the
park containing the notice, "Beware of the buck." Another witness, called by the plaintiff, testified that the park contains about
eleven acres; that there were nine deer in the park, among which
were three bucks, the oldest being four years old; that he first
heard that the buck was ugly when the plaintiff was attacked and
knocked down; that notices were put up at different places in the
park a year or two before, cautioning visitors not to tease or worry
the deer, and that he had no knowledge or belief prior to the accident that the buck or any other of the herd would attack any person if they were not disturbed. Expert witnesses were called by
the plaintiff, and they gave it as their opinion that the male deer
in the fall of the year is a dangerous animal.
Five witnesses were examined in behalf of the plaintiff, but the
bill of exceptions does not show that the defendant company gave
any evidence in reply, nor is it stated that the whole testimony
introduced by the plaintiff is reported. When the evidence was
* closed, the defendant moved that the action be dismissed, that the
VOL. XX=I.-78
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plaintiff be nonsuited, and that the court direct the jury to return
a verdict in favor of the defendant.
Discussion of the first two propositions involved in the motion
is wholly unnecessary, for two reasons: 1. Because the jurisdiction
of the court was beyond doubt, and the record shows that the suit
was well brought. 2. Because it is not competent for the circuit
court to order a peremptory nonsuit in any case.
Circuit courts cannot grant a nonsuit, but the defendant at the
close of the plaintiff's case may move the court to instruct the jury
that the evidence introduced by the plaintiff is not sufficient to
maintain the action and to direct a verdict for the defendant. In
considering the motion, the court proceeds upon the ground, that
all the facts stated by the plaintiff's witnesses are true, and the rule
is, that the motion will be denied unless the court is of the opinion,
that in view of the whole evidence, and of every inference the law
allows to be drawn from it, the plaintiff has not made out a case
which would warrant the jury to find a verdict in his favor: Bank
v. Bank, 3 Cliff. 206; Same v. Same, 10 Wall. 655.
Tested by that rule, which is everywhere admitted to be correct,
it is clear that the motion of the defendant was properly denied,
for several reasons: 1. Because the proof of injury was overwhelm-'
ing. 2. Because the allegation that the animal was vicious and
mischievous was satisfactorily proved. 3. Because the evidence to
prove that the defendant company had knowledge of the vicious
and mischievous propensity of the animal was properly left to the
jury, and it appearing that the Circuit Court overruled the motion
for a new trial, the court here cannot disturb the verdict except for
error of law. 4. Because the cause of action in the case arises
not merely from the keeping of the animal, but from the keeping
of the same after knowledge of its vicious and mischievous propensities. 5. Because the evidence is plenary that the plaintiff was
rightfully in the place where she was injured, and that the owners
of the vicious animal, inasmuch as the evidence tended to show
that they had knowledge of its mischievous propensities, are justly
held liable for the consequences: Sile8 v. Nav. Co., 33 L. J. (N.
S.) 311 ; Oakes v. iSalding, 40 Vt. 851 ; Sarch v. Blackburn, 4
C. & P. 300; Same v. Same, 1 Moo. & Mal. 505; Besozzi v.
Harris, 1 Fost. & Fin. 92.
Whoever keeps an animal accustomed to attack or injure mankind, with the knowledge of its dangerous propensities, says Addi-
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son, is prima facie liable to an action for damages at the suit of
any person attacked or injured by the animal, without proof of any
negligence or default in the securing or taking care of the animal,
the gidt of the action being the keeping of the animal after knowledge of its mischievous disposition; Addison on Torts, ed. 1876,
283; Dickson v. McCoy, 39 X{. Y. 401; Applebee v. Percy, Law
Rep. 9 C. P. 650; Bigelow's Leading Cases on Torts 489.
2. Witnesses are not ordinarily allowed to give opinions as to
conclusions dependent upon facts not necessarily involved in the
controversy, but an exception to that rule is recognised in the case
of experts, who are entitled to give their opinions as to conclusions
from facts within the range of their specialties, which are too recondite to be properly comprehended and weighed by ordinary reasoners : 1 Wharton's Ev., § 440.
Men who have made questions of skill or science the object of
their particular study, says Phillips, are competent to give their opinions in evidence. Such opinions ought in general to be deduced
from facts that are not disputed or from facts given in evidence, but
the author proceeds to say that they need not be founded upon their
own personal knowledge of such facts, but may be founded upon
the statement of facts proved in the case. Medical men for example
may give their opinions not only as to the state of a patient they
may have visited, or as to the cause of the death of a person whose
body they have examined, or as to the nature of the instruments
which caused the wounds they have examined, but also in cases
where they have not themselves seen the patient, and have only
heard the symptons and particulars of his state detailed by other
witnesses at the trial. Judicial tribunals have in many instances
held that medical works are not admissible, but they everywhere
hold that men skilled in science, art or particular trades, may give
their opinions as witnesses in matters pertaining to their professional
calling: 1 Phil. Ev., ed. 1868, 778.
It must appear, of course, that the witness is qualified to speak
to the point of inquiry, whether it respects a patented invention, a
question in chemistry, insurance, shipping, seamanship, foreign law,
or of the habits of animals, whether ferce nature or domestic.
On questions of science, skill or trade, or others of like kind,
says Greenleaf, persons of skill, sometimes called experts, may not
only testify to facts, but are permitted to give their opinions in evidence : 1 Greenl. Ev., § 400 ; Buster v. Newkirk, 20 Johns. 75.
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Whether a witness is shown to be qualified or not as an expert is
a preliminary question to be determined in the first place by the
court, and the rule is that if the court admits the testimony then it
is for the jury to decide whether any, and if any, what, weight is
to be given to the testimony. Cases arise where it is very much a
matter of discretion with the court whether to receive or exclude
the evidence, but the Appellate Court will not reverse in such a
case unless the ruling is manifestly erroneous: Towboat Co. v.
tarrs,19 P. F. Smith 41; Pagev. Parker,40 N. H. 59; Tucker
v. Railroad,118 Mass. 548.
Experts may be examined, says Justice GRIER, to explain the
terms of art and the state of the art at any given time. Speaking
of controversies between a patentee and an infringer, he says that
experts may explain to the court and jury the machines, models or
drawings exhibited in the case. They may point out the difference
or identity of the mechanical devices involved in their construction,
and adds that the maxim "cuique in sua arte credendum," permits
them to be examined in questions of art or science peculiar to their
trade or profession: Winans v. Railroad, 21 How. 100; Ogden
v. Paron8, 23 Id. 170.
Even if the witnesses are not properly to be regarded as experts,
the court is of the opinion that the testimony was properly admitted
as a matter of common knowledge.
Well-guarded instructions were given to *Ae jury on the subject,
as appears from the transcript. Their attention was directed to the
testimony, and they vrere told that it was for them to determine its
weight, which shows -that the defendant has no just ground of complaint.
3. Complaint is also made by the defendant that one sentence
of the charge of the court in respect to the damages is erroneous.
When you have made up your mind, said the judge, as to the
amount really sustained, you are not to be nice in the award of
compensation. It should be liberal.
Exception was taken to that remark, without request for a different instruction, or that it should be qualified or explained in any
way. Before that remark was made, the judge cautioned the jury
against giving credence to any extravagant statement of the injuries
received, and then told them that when they had made up their
minds as to the amount-meaning the amount of the injury really
sustained-they should not be nice in the award of compensation,
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adding, as if to qualify the antecedent caution given in favor of the
defendant, that it should be liberal.
In examining the charge of the court, for the purpose of ascertaining its correctness in point of law, the whole scope and bearing
of it must be taken together. It is wholly inadmissible to take
up single and detached passages and to decide upon them, without
attending to the context or without incorporating such qualifications
and explanations as naturally flow from other parts of the instructions: Magniac v. Thompson, 7 Pet. 300.
Instruction given by the court at the trial are entitled to a reasonable interpretation, and, if the proposition as stated is not erroneous, they are not, as a general rule, to be regarded as incorrect
on account of omissions or deficiencies not pointed out by the
excepting party; Castle v. Bullard, 23 How. 189.
Appellate courts are not inclined to grant a new trial on account
of an ambiguity in the charge to the jury, where it appears that
the complaining party made no effort at the trial to have the matter
explained: Locke v. United States, 2 Cliff. 580; Smith v. McNaMara, 4 Lans. 174.
Requests for such a purpose may be made at the close of the
charge, to call the attention of the judge to the supposed error,
inaccuracy or ambiguity of expression, and where nothing of the
kind is done, the judgment will not be reversed, unless the court is
of the opinion that the jury were misled or wrongly directed: Car-

ver v. Jackson, 4 Pet. 81; White v. McLean, 57 N. Y. 672.
None of the exceptions can be sustained and there is no error in
the record.
Judgment affirmed.
The decision in the principal case
upon the question of liability for injury
done by wild animals, whatever view
may be taken of the dictum of the court
hereinafter referred to, is clearly correct,
for the reason that the evidence tended
clearly to show that the owners of the
animal, which did the injury, had notice
of his mischievous propensities, which,
under all the authorities, imposed upon
them the obligation of taking proper
precautions to prevent his injuring persons rightfully upon the premises, none
of which, it seems, were taken in this

case. Whether the rule laid down in
Hale's Pleas of the Crown 430, pt.
1, a. 33, and approved by the court in
the principal case, is also in all respects correct, is perhaps open to more
question. With respect to this subject,
Lord H&LE, quoting as authority 3 Edw.
3, Coron. 311 ; Stane. P. C. 17 a, there
says that "these things seem to be
agreeable to law: 1. If the owner have
notice of the quality of his beast, and
it doth any body hurt, he is chargeable
with an action for it.
"2. Though he have no particular
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notice that he did any such thing before,
yet if he be a beast that is ferm naturce,
as a lion, a bear, a wolf, yea, an ape or
a monkey, if he get loose and do harm
to any person, the owner is liable to an
action for the damage ; and so Iknew it
adjudged in Andrew Baker's Case, whose
child was bit by a monkey that broke his
chain and got loose.
" 3. And, therefore, in case of such a
wild beast, or in case of a bull or cow
that doth damage, where the owner
knows of it, he must, at his peril, keep
him up safe from doing hurt ; for though
he use diligence to keep him up, if he
escape and do harm, the owner is liable
to answer damages."
The doctrine of propositions 2 and 3
above quoted, seems to make the owner
of beasts ferce naturce liable absolutely
as an insurer against all iniuries done
by such beasts ; and the rule is generally
stated to be, as stated by Lord HALE,
that the owner must keep up such beasts
at his peril, though it is believed that in
most of the cases where the doctrine has
been touched upon, it has been assumed
as an existing rule of law, rather than
adjudged after argument and consideration of the question upon principle and
authority. See Bull. N. P. 77; Id.
Raym. 1583; Besozzi v. Harris, I F. &
F. 93.
It is to be observed, before considering this subject further, that even if the
above rule is correct, this liability does
not properly depend upon the mere classification of the animal as being ferm
natur, to which class would belong
rabbits and many other animals having
no na-ural disposition to injure man, but
rather upon the natural savage propensities of the animal, as in the case of
lions, tigers, &a. See Earl v. Van Alstyne, 8 Barb. 630. It is also to be obser-ed that in any event the plaintiff
complaining of an injury received from
such an animal, must not have been
guilty of contributory negligence himself. See Besozzi v. Harris, supra.

To return to the question under consideration, the case of May v. Burdett,
9 Q. B. (N. S.) 101 ; s. c. Big. Lead.
Cases on Torts 478, is usually cited in
cases where this subject is considered.
This was an action for injuries received
by the bite of a monkey, and a verdict
for the plaintiff with damages was sustained and judgment rendered thereon,
although no negligence was charged in
the declaration. The court, in this case,
per DENMAN, C. J., were of opinion
that the gist of the action is in the keeping of the animal after knowledge of its
mischievous propensities, and state that
the conclusion to be drawn from an examination of all the authorities appears
to be, that a person keeping a mischievous animal, with knowledge of its propensities, is bound to keep it secure at
his peril, and that, if it does mischief,
negligence is presumed without express
averment. See, also, Wolf v. Chalker,
31 Conn. 130. With reference to the
case of May v. Burdett, Judge Cooi.y,
in his work on Torts, p. 379, note, says,
that "the decision in this case seems to be
that the keeper of such an animal, isprimafacie responsible for the injuries done
by it ; but it is not decided that he may
not meet the case by showing that he
observed in respect to it proper care."
In Laverone v. Mangianti, 41 Cal.
138, the plaintiff was entering defendant's premises on lawful business, and,
while ascending the steps to his house,
one of the steps, which was loose, slipped from its position, and plaintiff's leg
went through the opening, and was
seized and bitten by defendant's dog,
whichwas chained under thesteps in such
a manner that he could not reach one
ascending the steps. No negligence was
averred in the complaint, and the action
was based on the theory that the owner
of a dog, which he knows is vicious, is
bound, at his peril, so to keep him that
no one shall be bitten, unless it be
through the culpable negligence of the
party who suffers the injury.
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RHODES, C. J., in delivering the
opinion of the court, said: "It is in-isted, on behalf of the defendants, that
a person may lawfully keep a ferocious dog-one that is accustomed to
bite mankind. That position may be
conceded, and it may also be conceded
that he has the same right to keep a
tiger. The danger to mankind and the
injury, if any is suffered, comes from
the same source-the ferocity of the
animal. In determining the responsibility of the keeper for an injury inflicted by either animal, the only difference I can see between the two cases
is, that in case of an injury caused by a
dog, the knowledge of the keeper that
the dog was ferocious, must be alleged
and proven, for all dogs are not ferocious ; while in the case of a tiger, such
knowledge will be presumed from the
nature of the animal. This knowledge,
however, established, whether by evidence or by presumption, is the same in
substance, and works the same results.
When the facts in two or more cases are
alike, the law will pronounce similar
judgments. It will not be doubted that
for an injury inflicted by a tiger, his
owner will be responsible, and, in my
opinion, there is as little reason to doubt
that the owner of a dog, which he knows
to be ferocious, is equally liable for a
similar injury occasioned by it. In
either case, the owner, knowing the vicious propensities and ferocious nature
of the animal, keeps it at his own risk,
and he should bear the responsibility for
any injury inflicted by it upon a person
who is free from fault." See, also,
Wof v. Chalker, supra. CROCKETT, J.,
dissented from the opinion of the court
i- Laverone v. Jfangianti, holding that
tne more reasonable rule was announced
in Sarc v. Blackburn, 5 C. & P. 207,
to the effect that every one has a right
to keep a watch dog for the protection
f his premises, and is only responsible
'ri injuries resulting from negligence
-a the keeping.

With reference to this general subject,
Judge COOLET, in his valuable work on
Torts, p. 348, referring to the above
quotations from Lord HALE, very reasonably says : "If this doctrine is good
law at this day, it must be because the
keeping of wild beasts accustomed to
bite and worry mankind is unlawful.
For, if the keeping of such beas:s is
not a wrong in itself, then no wrong
can come from it until some wrongful
circumstance intervenes ; in other words,
until there is negligence. * * * The
keeping of wild animals for many purposes, has come to be recognised as
proper and useful ; theyt are exhibited
through the country with public license
and approval; governments and municipal corporations expend large sums
in obtaining and providing for them;
and the idea of legal wrong in keeping
and exhibiting them is never indulged.
It seems, therefore, safe to say that the
liability of the owner or keeper for any
injury done by them to the person or
property of others, must rest on the doctrine of negligence. A very high degree
of care is demanded of those who have
them in charge, but, if, notwithstanding such care, they are enabled to commit mischief, the case should be referred
to the category of accidental injuries,
for which a civil action will not lie."
See also, Earl v. Van Alstgne, 8 Barb.
630, per SE LDEN, J. ; Scribnerv. Kelley,
3 Id. 14 ; Lavaronev. l1angianti,supra,
dissenting opinion of CROCKETT, J.
I have quoted thus largely from that
portion of Judge CooLEY's work treating upon this subject, because it seems
more satisfactory than any other discussion that has come to my notice.
Perhaps, on grounds of policy, the
strict rule that the owner of a wild
beast must keep him in at his peril,
may be better adapted to promote security of person, but if it be true, as it is
believed to be, that the keeping of wild
beasts is notper se a wrong, it is difficult
to avoid the conclusion that there should

PUSK v. STEAMBOAT CHARLES MORGAN.
be no liability for injuries inflicted by
them unless negligence is shown, either
as a presumption or by actual proof.
Although, hitherto, few cases have
arisen upon the question, it is deserving
of consideration, when the question

does fairly arise, whether the old cora
mon-law rule should not in view of tho
foregoing considerations, be modifiedw
accord with the above views.
MinsHALL D. Ewar...

United &ate&Distriot Court, othem Diatrictof Ohio.
LOUISA C. RUSK,

.IBELLANT,

V. STEAMBOAT CHARLES MORGAN.

The wife of a passenger brought an action in rem against the steamboat, to
recover damages for the death of her husband, caused by the negligence of the
officers of the vessel.
Plea to the jurisdiction. Jurisdiction sustained.

IN admiralty.
This was an action in rem, by the widow of Edwin Rusk, against
the steamboat Charles Morgan, to recover damages for the death of
her husband. The libel alleged that her husband was a passenger
upon said boat, from New Orleans to Cincinnati, and that owing to
the negligence and carelessness of the master and. officers of the
boat, in leaving the hatchways open at night, without light and
guard, be fell through one of the hatchways into the hold of the
vessel and was instantly killed. Prayer for damages. Claimant
files a plea to the jurisdiction in the form of exceptions to the libel,
on the ground, that in admiralty, as at common law, no action is
maintainable for the wrongful death of another, either in personam

or in rem.
P. J. Donham, for exception.
Henry ifooper, for libellant.
The opinion was delivered by
SwiNG, District Judge.-From an examination of the English
authorities, it is ve:ry clear, that no right of action existed at common law for the death of a human being. This doctrine is first
announced in the case of ffiggins v. Butcher, Yelv. 89, which
was an action brought by the husband for the death of his wife.
Then came the celebrated case of Baker v. Bolton, 1 Camp. 493,
which was also an action brought by the husband, to recover damages for the death of his wife. These are all the cases we have
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been able to find prior to the passage of Lord CAMPBELL'S Act in
1846. But that this was the recognised doctrine is shown by the
preamble of the act, which recites that "Whereas no action at law
is now maintainable against a person, who, by his wrongful act,
neglect or default, may have caused the death of another person,
&c.,"and the act then proceeds by its provisions to give such
right of action. This is further shown by the case of Glaholm v.
Barker, Law Rep. 1 Ch.App. 226, in which Lord Justice TuRNER
said: "Lord CAMPBELL'S Act first introduced into the law of this
country a remedy in case of injuries attended with the loss of life.
The law up to the time of the passing of this act stood thus, that
in case of death resulting from an injury, the remedy for the injury
died with the person." The same doctrine is maintained in Osham
v. Gillet, 8 Exch. 88, and in Bac. Abr. "Master and Servant,"
0.; Blake v. Midland Railway Co., 18 Q. B. 93. In fact we
have not been able to find a single reported case in which a contrary
doctrine has been held. The English courts and law writers may
not have founded this doctrine upon such principles, as may now
appear sound to us; but, nevertheless, it cannot be disputed that
such was the doctrine of the common law.
In the United States this principle is not so well settled, and yet
the weight of authority is to the same effect, as will be seen by
reference to the following cases: Carey v. Berkshire Railroad Co.,
and Skinner v. -Housatonic Railroad Corp. Co., 1 Cush. 475;
Kearney v. Boston & Worcester Railroad Co., 9 Id. 109; Rollenbeck v. Berkshire Railroad Co., Id. 480; PennsylvaniaRailroad
Co. v. Henderson, 1 P. F. Smith 322; Whilford v. PanamaRailroad Co., 23 N. Y. 470; Green v. Hudson Railroad Co., 2
Keyes (N. Y.) 294; Conn. Life Ins. Co. v. N. Y. & N. H.
Railroad Co., 25 Conn. 265; .Eden v. Lexington Railroad Co.,
14 B. Mon. 204; Wenley v. Cin., 1am. 6 .Dayton Railroad
Co., 1 Handy 481; Hyatt v. Adams, 16 Mich. 180.
On the other hand, there is the case of -Ford v. Charnal, 20
Wend. 210, in which, however, this question was not made; but it
has since been overruled by the New "York courts (see cases cited).
The case of James v. Christy, 18 Mo. 162, is usually cited as
maintaining the opposite doctrine, but it will be found that the
decision of the case turned upon a special statute of Missouri. In
Sheeld v. Younge, 15 Ga. 849, the question was clearly made and
decided, but none of the American cases seem to have been referred
VoL. XXVI. -79
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to by the learned judge who delivered the opinion of the court.
And in Sullivan v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 3 Dillon C. C.
Rep. 334, the circuit judge made a very vigorous assault upon the
common-law doctrine and refused to follow it; but this case was
taken to the Supreme Court of the United States, and dismissed
for want of jurisdiction, at the October term 1877; as no opinion
was delivered by the court, we are unable to say whether this point
was considered. So that there is only the Georgia case, which
seems to directly deny the common-law, doctrine. But that this
principle or doctrine, that no such right of action existed, has been
generally accepted in the United States, is further shown by the
fact that in a large number of the states, such right of action is
expressly given by legislative enactment.
But it is urged on the part of the libellant, that whatever the
common-law principle may be, that the civil law permitted the
action, and that the admiralty courts of the United States are not
bound b'y the decisions of the common law. The decisions of the
federal courts are not uniform upon this point, although the
majority of them sustain it.
In Plummer v. Webb, Ware 69, it would seem that the direct
question was not determined, but jurisdiction in admiralty was
maintained by the United States district judge. The case was
appealed to the Circuit Court, and after amendment of the libel,
the action was dismissed by Justice SToRY for want of jurisdiction.
See 4 Mason 380.
In Crapo v. Allen, 1 Sprague 184, it was held that actions in
admiralty, for mere personal torts, did not survive the death of the
person injured. But in Cutting v. Seabury, 1 Sprague 522, the
judge said it was not the settled law, that no action could be maintained for damages occurring upon the death of a human being,
and that such right ought to exist; but the precise point was left
undecided. It was held in the case of The Steamship City of
Brussels, 6 Benedict 370, where a child had died from the negligence of the officers of the vessel, that this action could be maintained in rem, as arising upon the contract of passage. And in
The Sea Gull, Chase's Decisions 145, Chief Justice CHASE decided
that an action in rem could be maintained in admiralty by the
husband for the death of his wife; and in The Highland Light,
Id. 150, he affirmed the same doctrine. In the latter case, the
widow and son filed their libel in rem, to recover damages for the
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death of the father and husband, and the same judge held, that
while the action could not be maintained in rem, the action would
lie in personam, and that the admiralty court had jurisdiction.
This case seems to have been decided wholly upon the construction
of the statute; while the former was based entirely upon the general right to maintain such an action in the admiralty court.
In Coggins v. May .Helms, reported in 23 Int. Rev. Rec. 384,
it was held in an action by the wife of the chief mate of a schooner,
which was run down by a steamship, causing the death of the husband, that an action in rem would lie in the admiralty court, to
recover damages for his death, following the decision of Chief
Justice CHASE. I find upon reference to the records of this court,
that at the June Term 1870, the District Court dismissed the libel
of Thomas v. Tros. Sherlock et al., which sought to recover damages for the death of the husband of libellant, for want of jurisdiction. The case was appealed to the Circuit Court, and by consent
of both parties the decree of the District Court was affirmed.
There is nothing in the record, however, to show that this point
was raised and decided. [See note, post, p. 629.]
So far as I have been able to ascertain, these are all the cases in
which the question at issue has been raised and determined. In
Co. v. Chase, 16 Wall. 522, Justice CLIFFORD diSThe &Seamboat
cusses the question, and after noticing the cases of Crapo v. Allen,
1 Sprague 184, and The Sea Gull, Chase's Dec. 145, adds:
"Difficulties it must be conceded will attend the solution of this
question, but it is not necessary to decide it in this case."
As the case at bar will probably go to the Supreme Court of the
United States, it will be better for all parties that the appeal should
be taken after a trial upon its merits; I shall therefore overrule
the exceptions to the jurisdiction of the court.
The above opinion contains a full

DII. C. C. 334, makes a very vigorous

and exhaustive statement of all the
common-law decisions upon the point
under consideration, and there can be
no doubt, that so far as the common law
is concerned, the decision fully sustains
the principle announced in Baker v. Bolton, I Camp. 493, "that no action at
law is maintainable against a person
who wrongfully causes the death of
another." Itis true that Judge DILLO1,

assult upon this doctrine. This was an
action brought by the father to recover
damages, for the loss of services of a
minor son, killed by negligence of
defendants. There was no statute in
Nebraska, where the action was brought,
giving a remedy for the wrong. The
learned judge proceeds to discuss the
doctrine, that "in a civil court, the
death of a human being cannot be com-

in Sldlivan v. Un. PacificRailroad Co., 3

plained of as an injury;" and finally
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decides, that the case of Baker v. Bolton,
was not reasoned, and ought not to be
followed in a state where the subject
was open for settlement ; that the rule
itself was incapable of vindication and
not deeply rooted in the common law;
and that the father could recover on
general or common-law grounds. But
in spite of this it must be admitted, that
the cases in England and America
fully sustain the statement in the opinion, that at common law the weight of
authority is decidedly in favor of the
rule, that the death of a human being
cannot be complained of as an injury,
h3wever illogical may be the reasoning
upon which the rule is based.
The question, however, raised in the
principal case is a different one, viz.:
can damages be recoveredfor the wrongful
death of a party, in a Court of Admiralty,
independent of the statutory remedy.
The Supreme Court of the United
States not having yet passed upon the
question, the ultimate determination is
still a matter of speculation. The final
solution of the difficulty will probably
turn upon the view which that court
may entertain of the origin, and extent
of jurisdiction of the Admiralty Courts.
As in England, the question with us is
still a vexed one, and has to be constantly and imperfectly answered. In
the case of The Ruckers, 4 Robinson's
Ad. R. 74, the editor says in a note:
"It is sometimes supposed, that the
practice of the Court of Admiralty of
this kingdom has been derived from the
civil law, without holding or acknowledging a common interest in the municipal usages, customs or institution of
our country. If the fact were as stated
by Spelman, ' that the jurisdiction of
the Court of Admiralty, was exercised
by the kings of England in their household, with the assistance of the judges
of the common law till the reign of
Edward 3 ;' it would be a sufficient
refutation of such an hypothesis. If
it be otherwise, however, there will

still be abundant reason to suppose that
the principles on which the jurisdiction
of the admiralty was founded, were
perfectly consonant to the principles of
our municipal jurisprudence, and derived from the same sources. The
Roman law afforded no model from
which such a system could be borrowed,
nor would it be easy to assign to it distinctly any other foreign origin." This
was written in 1801. The same language
is used to-day by those who desire to
limit the jurisdiction of the Admiralty
Courts to the usages of the municipal
courts of the state. As is well known,
Mr. Justice STORy, in De Lovio v. Boit,
2 Gall. 399, decided, that the Admiralty
Courts were governed by the rules and
proceedings of the civil law, and that
their jurisdiction in torts and contracts
were co-extensive with other foreign
maritime courts.
And from Domat Civil Law 1550,
and 1 McQueen 750, it appears that the
civil law permitted such an action.
All the cases in which this question
has been raised in the various District
and Circuit Courts of the United States,
(at least so far as they are reported),
are referred to in the opinion. Chief
Justice CHASE seems to be the first who
held that the Admiralty Courts had
jurisdiction of an action to recover
damages for the wrongful death of a
human being; although other judges
had intimated that "natural equity and
the general principles of law," were in
favor of it.
In The Sea Gull, Chase's Dec. 145, the
libellant brought his action against the
vessel to recover damages for the death
of his wife, occasioned by a collision.
The objection was urged that the action
did not survive, and that the court had
no jurisdiction. It was held that the husband could recover in an action in rem.
In The HighlandLight, Chase's Dec. 150,
the wife of a handon the vessel, who had
been killed through the negligence of
the engineer, sued for damages in rem.
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The court affirmed the principle of the
preceding case, but held that the action
should have been brought in personam
against the owners of the boat, following the Act of Congress, which prescribes certain remedies for wrongs
sustained through the negligence of the
officers of steam-vessels.
In Brannick v. Sea Gull, 16 Pitts. L.
J- 194, the wife sued in rem, for damages for the death of her husband, and
while navigating in a row-boat in the
harbor of Baltimore, was killed by a
collision with the defendant steamer.
The same judge held that she could
recover, and that the court had jurisdiction.
These cases were followed by the district judge of New York, in the case of
The City of Brussels, 6 Ben. 371 ; this
was in 1873. In The SteamshipTowanda,
34 Leg. Int. 394, decided in Oct. 1877,
by Circuit Judge MoKENNAN (affirming
the decree of District Judge CADWALADEn), it was held that an action was
maintainable in the Admiralty Courts,
to recover damages for the wrongful
death of a human being. It was an
action in rem, brought by the wife, whose
husband had been killed in a collision
at sea. From the agreed statement of
facts, it appears that the steamer ran
down the schooner, and drowned the
chief mate, the husband of libellant ;
"his death being the direct result of
the negligence of the steamer in causing the collision." The jurisdiction of
the court in a case of this kind, was
the sole question at issue in the Circuit
Court. The learned judge admits that
at common law, the weight of authority

is against the right of action, and that
its origin is purely statutory, but following Chief Justice CHASE, declines to
he bound by the decisions of the common law, and adds: The exercise of
such a jurisdiction by Courts of Admiralty, is at least consonant with " natural
equity, and the general principles of
law, and with the benign spirit of
English and American legislation on
the subject.2
The unreported case of Thomas v.
Sherlock (referred to in the opinion),
was compromised by the payment of a
sum of money to the libellant. In
Benedict Adm., 309, it is said, "that
causes of action for mere personal torts
are not regarded in admiralty as surviving the death of the person injured ;
and q state statute will not enable an
administrator to maintain an action for
such tort, committed on the high seas."
We should rather hope that when the
question comes before the Supreme
Court of the United States, that distinguished tribunal will find it more
consonant with the principles of natural
equity and justice to allow the action,
than to follow the unreasoned decision
of Lord ELLENNOROUGH in Baker v.
Bolton.
At all events, so far, the precedents,
with scarcely an exception, sustain the
ruling that the action for a tort resulting in death survives the person killed,
and an action to recover damages therefor may be brought in a Court of Admiralty, always provided that the injury
was received at sea, or upon waters
navigable from the sea.
L H.

Supreme Court of Wisconsin.
JANE WILLIAMS v. WILLIAM WILLIAMS.
When the evidence shows that at the time of the commencement of the cohabitation and conduct, from which it is sought to prove a marriage in fact, there was
in fact no such marriage, the mere continuance of such cohabitation and conduct,
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without something more to indicate that there had been a change in the relations
of the parties to each other, would not be sufficient to show a marriage in fact,
subsequent to the commencement of such cohabitation and conduct.
Subh contract may be proved by circumstances, but they must be such as to exclude the inference or presumption that the former relation continued, and satisfactorily prove that it had been changed into that of actual matrimony by mutual
consent.
It was therefore error, where the parties originally cohabited under a void contract of marriage, to refuse to charge that if the subsequent conduct and declaration
of the parties arose from and was the result of such void ceremony, that there
could be no presumption of a subsequent marriage.

THIs action was brought by the plaintiff to recover her dower
in the lands of which Lewis Williams died seised. The defendant
pleaded that the plaintiff never was the lawful wife of said Williams.
It appeared from the evidence, upon the trial of this issue, that
the plaintiff and the deceased participated in a marriage ceremony,
at Racine, in the state of Wisconsin, May 9th 1870; which was
celebrated by the pastor of the Presbyterian church, and witnessed
by the daughter of the plaintiff and two other persons. That the
plaintiff thereafter dwelt with the deceased until his death, August
29th 1873, and that she was universally reputed to be his wife
during all that time. It was also shown that the plaintiff had
joined the deceased, as his wife, in the execution of a warrantee
deed dated August 23d 1873. The defendant, on the other hand,
proved that the plaintiff was divorced from William Jones, in
November 1870, subsequently to her alleged marriage to Williams,
under proceedings instituted by her in the Circuit Court for Kenosha county, in the state of Wisconsin, in October 1870, under the
name of Jane Jones. In rebuttal the plaintiff introduced evidence
to show that the said Jones had formerly married one Amelia Rees,
who was still living at the time this issue was tried.
The court, at the request of the plaintiff, charged the jury that
"in an action by a widow to recover dower in the lands of her deceased husband, it is not necessary for her to make strict proof of
marriage, that is proof of an actual solemnization of marriage-but
proof by cohabitation as husband and wife, acts and declarations of
the husband recognizing her as his wife, and conduct of the parties
may be sufficient."
The defendant asked the court to charge, inter alia: " The
judgment roll in the case of Jane Jones v. William Jones, which
is offered in evidence by the stipulation, is conclusive evidence upon
the question as to the plaintiff being the wife of William Jones, in
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.November 1870, and unless you find that a marriage was solemnized between the plaintiff and Lewis Williams, after the divorce in
November 1870, the plaintiff cannot recover, and your verdict
must be for defendant." Which request, together with certain
other requests, quoted in the opinion of the Supreme Court, were
refused by said court.
The court further charged, inter alia: "If on the 9th of May
1870, the plaintiff was the lawful wife of Jones, the said marriage
of the plaintiff with Lewis Williams was void, and the plaintiff did
not thereby become the lawful wife of the said Williams. But if
at the time of the plaintiff's marriage to Jones, he, Jones, had a
lawful wife then living, the plaintiff's marriage to Jones was void,
and did not operate to render her marriage with Williams invalid.
The judgment of divorce rendered in November 1870, in the action
between the plaintiff and William Jones, has been received in evidence and is claimed by the defendant as conclusive as to the
validity of plaintiff's marriage with Jones. I think, and so instruct
you, that such judgment is not conclusive in this action as to the
validity of such marriage. You will determine from the evidence
whether Jones, at the time of his alleged marriage with the plaintiff, had a wife by a previous marriage then living.
And you will determine from a preponderance of the testimony
whether the plaintiff was the lawful wife of Lewis Williams, Sr.,
and his widow. If you so find, then as such widow of said Lewis
Williams she is entitled to dower in all of the real estate of which
Williams was seised during her coverture, and is entitled to recover.
during this action."
The defendant duly excepted to the refusal of the court to charge
the jury as by him requested, and to the charge as given and above
quoted, and the jury having found for the plaintiff, and a new trial
being refusedthe defendant duly appealed to the Supreme Court.
V. & C. Quarles, for respondent.
John T. .ish, for appellant.
TAYLOR, J.-This action is brought by the plaintiff to recover
dower in certain lands in the possession of the defendant.
The plaintiff bases her claim for dower upon the allegation that,
she is the widow of one Lewis Williams, Sr., deceased.
The only question which is seriously litigated is, whether the.
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plaintiff is the widow of said deceased. The evidence shows that
the plaintiff was married by a formal marriage ceremony to said
Lewis Williams, Sr., on the 9th day of May 1870, and tends to
show that she lived with him as his wife from that time to the time
of his death, August 20th 1873.
The appellant claims that at the time plaintiff married the
deceased, she was the lawful wife of one William Jones, who was
then living and not divorced from the plaintiff. The plaintiff does
not deny that she had been married to said Jones, and had lived
with him as his wife, but she alleges and shows that she was duly
and lawfully divorced from him by the judgment of the Circuit
Court of Kenosha county in this state in the month of November
1870.
It appears from the stipulation of the parties, that such divorce
suit was instituted by the plaintiff in this action by the name of
Jane Jones, and that she alleged in her complaint therein, that she
and the said William Jones were duly and lawfully married in
Wales, in the year 1.863. Such action was commenced in October
1870, the complaint was sworn to by the plaintiff, the summons was
personally served on the defendant William Jones, *and as a ground
for the divorce, the complaint charged the said William Jones
with wilful desertion for more than one year before the commencement of such action. The judgment in that action was entered
in November 1870, and decreed and adjudged that the marriage
theretofore existing between the said Jane Jones and the said
William Jones be and the same was thereby dissolved, and each of
the parties freed from the obligations thereof.
The plaintiff further gave evidence tending to prove that at the
time of her marriage to William Jones, he (Jones), had another
wife living, from whom he had been divorced, and who was still living. The plaintiff recovered in the action in the court below, and
the defendant appeals to this court. The learned counsel for the
plaintiff and respondent insists that she was entitled to recover
upon either of two theories: First, if she was the lawful wife of
William Jones at the time she married Lewis Williams, Sr., she
was afterwards lawfully divorced from said Jones about two years
and nine months before the death of Lewis Williams, Sr., and
that as during all that time, she and the said Williams lived and
cohabited together as husband and wife that she was all that time
spoken of by the said Williams as his wife and treated by him as
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such; that she during all that time spoke of said Williams and
treated him as such, from the evidence in the case upon that point,
if necessary to sustain the plaintiff's claim that she was the widow
of said Williams, the jury would be justified in finding a marriage
in fact between the said Lewis Williams, Sr., and the plaintiff after
her divorce from the said Jones. Second, that there was sufficient
evidence in the case to justify the jury in finding that she never
was the lawful wife of William Jones, for the reason that he had
a wife living at the time she was married to him, and that such wife
is still living and not divorced; consequently her formal marriage
with the deceased Lewis Williams, Sr., on the 9th of May 1870,
was in every respect a lawful marriage.
The learned counsel for the appellant insists: First, that the
judgment rendered in the divorce suit between Jones and Jones,
given in evidence and entered sometime in November 1870, is conclusive evidence against the plaintiff, that at the time of the entry of
such judgment and from the date of her alleged marriage with the
said Williams in 1870, to time of the entry of such judgment, she
was the lawful wife of said William Jones, and that as a consequence her marriage with said Lewis Williams, Sr., on the 9th day
of May 1870, was absolutely void. Second, that there was not
sufficient evidence of an actual marriage between the plaintiff and
the said Lewis Williams, Sr., deceased, subsequent to the date of
the judgment in said divorce suit, and consequently she had failed
to prove that she was the widow of the said deceased. Third, that
the court erred in refusing to give to the jury the following instruction asked by the defendant:
"Testimony has been admitted of acts and conversations of
Lewis Williams, Sr., by which he recognised the plaintiff as his,
wife. This testimony was admitted as being competent and as
tending to show that the parties were married. If you find that
such acts of Jane Williams and Lewis Williams, Sr., which have
been given in evidence, arose from and were the result of a marriage ceremony, which took place between the plaintiff and Lewis
Williams, Sr., in May 1870, and that Jane Williams was then the
wife of William Jones, and that no marriage was ever solemnized between the plaintiff and Lewis Williams, Sr., after the
divorce was granted to the plaintiff in November 1870, from said
William Jones, then your verdict must be for the defendant.
"If you find that Lewis Williams, Sr., spoke of the plaintiff and
VOL. XXVII .
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introduced her as his wife, because of some pretended marriage
between the plaintiff and himself at the time when the plaintiff
was the wife of William Jones, and not because of any actual marriage solemnized or contracted after November 1870, then your
verdict must be for the defendant. If you find that no legal marriage was ever solemnized or contracted between Jane Williams,
the plaintiff, and Lewis Williams, Sr., then all evidence of acts
and declarations on the part of Lewis Williams, Sr., are unavailing, and the defendant is entitled to your verdict."
The fact that the first point made by the learned counsel for
the appellant, is one of such grave importance to the public and so
far-reaching in its effects upon the rights of persons not parties to
the action for divorce, if sustained to the extent claimed by the
learned counsel, and the want of time necessary to enable each
member of the court to make a thorough examination of the subject for himself, and the further reason that we are all agreed the
judgment must be reversed for the refusal of the court to instruct
the jury as requested by the counsel for the defendant, has induced
us to leave that question undecided.
That the instructions which are above set forth, and which were
requested by the defendant's counsel, or some instructions equivalent thereto, should have been given to the jury, is apparent upon
the evidence in the case. The plaintiff had proved a marriage
solemnized between herself and the deceased at a time when the
jury, from the evidence given on the trial, might have found that
she was the wife of said William Jones. It is admitted by the
learned counsel for the plaintiff, that it was necessary for her to
show by sufficient affirmative proof, that a lawful marriage in fact
existed between her and the deceased at the time of his death.
There was no pretence that there was any direct proof of any such
lawful marriage, unless the marriage on the 9th of May was a lawful marriage, and it is admitted by both parties that such marriage
was void, if at that time the plaintiff had another husband living.
The evidence also showed that the cohabitation, acts and declarations of the parties as to their living together as husband and wife
and their being married, commenced at the date of such marriage
in May 1870.
The authorities hold and this court is not inclined to hold otherwise, that in an action for dower the plaintiff is not required to make
proof of the actual solemnization of a marriage between the plain-
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tiff and the deceased, in whose estate she claims dower, but they
also hold that the evidence must be sufficient to establish the fact
of a lawful marriage between them. None of the cases hold that
living and cohabiting together as husband and wife, or even the
declarations of the parties that they are husband and wife, constitute a marriage in fact, or that such acts and declarations are a
substitute for the marriage contract; the extent to which the
authorities go is, that such evidence may be sufficient to prove a
lawful marriage in fact.
The law of this state declares that marriage is a civil contract
(see § 2328, Rev. Stat. 1878), and there is no statute law which
points out in what manner the contract must be entered into to
render it valid. It need not be in writing or in the presence of
witnesses, but there must be an agreement between the parties that
they will hold toward each other the relation of husband and wife,
with all the responsibilities and duties which the law attaches to
such relation, otherwise there can be no lawful marriage.
It would seem to follow, therefore, that every lawful marriage
must have been entered into by the parties at some particular date
or time, and that it cannot in any case be the simple result of
cohabitation or the continued conduct of the parties which ordinarily accompany the married state. As a general rule, when a
marriage is sought to be proved by conduct, cohabitation and repute,
the date of the marriage in fact, which such conduct and repute
tend to establish, is the date of the commencement of such conduct
and repute and not afterwards.
It follows, therefore, that when the evidence shows that at the
time of the commencement of the cohabitation and conduct, from
which it is sought to prove a marriage in fact, there was in fact no
such marriage, the mere continuance of such cohabitation and conduct, without something more to indicate that there had been a
change in the relations of the parties to each other, would not be
sufficient to show a marriage in fact, subsequent to the commencement of such cohabitation and conduct.
In the case at bar, if the jury had found that the marriage of the
parties on May 9th 1870, was void because of the fact that the
plaintiff had another husband then living, and they had also found
that all the acts, conduct and declaration of the parties, after the
date of the divorce of the plaintiff from such former husband,
"Carose from and were the result of such void ceremony," such find-
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ing, we think, would have negatived the inference of any marriage
in fact between the parties subsequent to such divorce, and as a
consequence, have defeated the plaintiff's recovery.
The same consequences would have resulted from a finding that
all the acts, conduct and declarations of Lewis Williams, Sr., were
in consequence of a marriage with the plaintiff when she was the
wife of another, and not in consequence of any marriage with her
after her divorce from such husband, because such finding would
necessarily have negatived any inference that he had contracted
any marriage in fact with the plaintiff after such divorce. However ignorant Lewis Williams, Sr., may have been of the fact that
the plaintiff had another husband living at the time he married
her, such marriage was absolutely void as to him, notwithstanding
his ignorance and good faith, and he could only make her his lawful wife by such marriage in fact, after the divorce of her former
husband. We are of the opinion also, that the third instruction
requested should have been given, and that the general charge did
not cure the error of the refusal. It would seem from the very
nature of the matter in issue, that if the jury found that no marriage was in fact ever solemnized or contracted, between the plaintiff
and the deceased, all the acts and declarations of the parties were
of no -avail. The only object in proving the acts and declarations
of the parties, was to establish the fact that a marriage was contracted between them, and if the jury found as a matter of fact,
that no marriage was in fact contracted, then all the other matters
:ntroduced into the case were of no consequence.
The only instructions given to the jury on the subject of what
evidence was necessary to establish a marriage between the parties,
were the following. At the request of the plaintiff the court gave
this instruction: "In an action by a widow to recover dower in
the land of her deceased husband, it is not necessary for her to
make strict proof of marriage, but proof by cohabitation as husband
and wife; acts and declarations of the husband, recognising her as
his wife, and conduct of the parties may be sufficient." In the
general charge, the court upon this subject said: "And you will
determine, from a, preponderance of the testimony, whether the
plaintiff was the lawful wife of Lewis Williams, Sr., and is his
widow." The court also charged the jury, that if they found that
the plaintiff had another husband living at the time of her marriage
to Williams, on the 9th of May 1870, then such marriage was void,
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and that she did not thereby become the wife of said Williams; but
he did not instruct the jury that if such marriage, of the 9th of
May 1870, was void, she could not recover in this action.
The case was submitted to the jury upon the issue as to whether
there had been a marriage in fact between the plaintiff and deceased,
after the plaintiff had obtained a divorce from William Jones, upon
the theory that it was entirely immaterial to the determination of
that issue, that the cohabitation and living together as husband and
wife, upon which the plaintiff relied to establish such marriage,
commenced at a time when it was impossible for them to contract
a lawful marriage. This was undoubtedly an erroneous view of the
case.
Courts cannot but look with suspicion upon a claim of marriage,
founded upon evidence of cohabitation and conduct, which is
consistent with the fact of actual marriage, where the evidence
affirmatively shows that at the time such cohabitation and conduct
commenced, there was in fact, no marriage, and such cohabitation
and conduct was meretricious and in violation of law. When such
fact is shown, the effect of the evidence upon the question of a
marriage, in fact, at the date of the commencenient of such unlawful cohabitation and conduct, is entirely destroyed, and in order to
establish a marriage subsequent to the commencement of such
unlawful and meretricious conduct, by continued cohabitation,
conduct and declarations of the parties, or by reputation, there
should be some affirmative evidence showing that the subsequent
relations of the parties were changed, and that that which was
meretricious and unlawful in its commencement had been rendered
lawful.
It would require much less proof to satisfy either a court or jury
that there was a marriage in fact between persons in good repute,
and as to whom there was no obstacle to marriage, when the proof
of marriage depended upon the fact of cohabitation as husband and
wife, and the recognition of each other as such, than when it appeared affirmatively that one or both of the parties claiming a marriage, upon like proofs, were at the time of the commencement of
the cohabitation incompetent to contract marriage. And this
would be especially so if it were shown that the party claiming
such marriage, had full knowledge at the time of the commencement of such cohabitation, that he or she was incompetent to contract a lawful marriage with the other party. The fact appearing
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that such party unlawfully commenced the cohabitation, would be
strong evidence that he or she would not hesitate to continue such
unlawful conduct after the disability had been removed. We think
the judge of the circuit court ought to have called the attention of
the jury to this view of the case and to have at least instructed
them, as requested by the counsel for the defendant, that if they
found that the plaintiff had another husband living at the time
she married the deceased, in May 1870, they must then inquire
whether there was any sufficient evidence in the case, from which
they could find a marriage in fact between the parties subsequent
to the time of her divorce from such former husband; and that he
should also have instructed them, that if the continued cohabitation
and conduct of the parties, and their declarations as to their being
married and being husband and wife, referred to their marriage
made in May 1870, and at a time when they could not lawfully marry, and not to any marriage in fact contracted after the
plaintiff's divorce, they must find that no marriage in fact was
proven.
The general rule upon the question of proof of marriage by
proof of cohabitation, conduct and declarations of the parties, is
stated by a learned judge as follows: "The general and ordinary
presumption of the law is in favor of innocence, in questions of
marriage, and of legitimacy where children are concerned. Cohabitation is presumed *to be lawful till the contrary appears. Where,
however, the connection between the parties is shown to have had
an illicit origin, and to be criminal in its nature, the law raises no
presumption of marriage:" 2 Kent 87; Jackson v. Utaw, 18
Johns. 346 ; 2 Greenl. Ev., § 464; Physik'8 -Estate,4 Am. Law
Reg. N. S. 418. The presumption against marriage, where the
connection between the parties is shown to have been illicit in
origin, may, however, be overcome by proofs, showing that the
original connection has changed in its character, and a subsequent
marriage may be established by circumstances, without actual proof
of a marriage in fact. The cases cited by the learned counsel for
the respondent in their brief in this case, fully establish this point;
the following cases also illustrate the same subject: Starr et al. v.
Peck, 1 Hill 270; Clayton v. Wlardell, 4 N. Y. 230; Canjolle
v. Perrie,23 Id. 90; O'Garav. Eisenlohr, 88 Id. 296; Foster v.
Hawley, 8 Hun 68. The rule laid down in the last case cited is
stated as follows: "A cohabitation illicit in its origin is presumed
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to be of that character, unless the contrary be proved, and cannot
be transformed into matrimony by evidence which falls short of
establishing the fact of an actual contract of marriage. Such contract may be proved by circumstances, but they must be such as to
exclude the inference or presumption that the former relation continued, and satisfactorily prove that it had been changed into that
of actual matrimony by mutual consent.
We are inclined to hold the rule as above stated to be the proper
rule, where applied to a case like the one at bar. Where the party
claiming a marriage (on the theory that she was lawfully married
to William Jones) deliberately entered into a bigamous marriage
contract with the deceased, and commenced cohabitation under such
contract, if, notwithstanding the fact that she knowingly commenced cohabiting with the deceased when she was the lawful wife
of another, she claims a lawful marriage with such deceased after
her divorce, and after she had thereby acquired the right to become
his wife, she ought to be required to establish the fact of subsequent marriage, either by express proof of the contract of marriage, or by circumstances which would clearly exclude the presumption that she continued to live with him under such illegal
contract of marriage.
The judgment of the circuit court is reversed, and the cause remanded for a new trial.
RYAN, 0. J., took no part in this case.
It is an elementary rule of evidence,
that where a particular status has been
proved, its continuance will be presumed, unless the contrary be shown
by testimony sufficient to rebut this
primafacie inference : Cargile v. Wood,
63 Mo. 501-514. If, therefore, cohabitation is illicit in its origin, there is a
necessary presumption that the connection continues meretricious, unless there
is some evidence that the character of
the relation has been changed : Cunningham v. Cunningham, 2 Dow. 483; Stewart v. Robertson, Law Rep. 2 Sc. Ap.
494; s. c. 13 Eng. Rep. 165; Yardley's Estate, 75 Penn. St. 207 ; Commonwealth v. Stump, 53 Penn. St. 132;
Bicking's Appeal, 2 Brewst. (Pa.) 202;

Wright v. Wright, 48 How. Pr. (N. Y.)
1; Barnum v. Barnum, 42 Md. 251;
Redgrave v. Redgrave, 38 Id. 93;
.Tones v. Jones, 45 Id. 144; Port v.
Port, 70 Ill. 484; Floyd v. Calvert, 53
Miss. 37; Rundle v. Pegram, 49 Miss.
751. The mere fact, however, that the
relation was unlawful in its inception,
does not in any wise debar the parties
from entering into a subsequent contract
of marriage. "Whether the agreement
of marriage preceded or followed the
first sexual intercourse, whether it was
five or ten years thereafter, if clearly
made and proved, it establishes a valid
marriage :" Richardv. Brehm, 73 Penn.
St. 140-5.
In the absence of a nullifying statute
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the status of marriage may be created
by the simple, secret, and perhaps, even
tacit, consent of a man and woman to
become husband and wife: DeThoren
v. Attornry-General, I Ap. Cas. 686-9 ;
s. c. 17 Eng. Rep. 72; Nathans's Case,
2 Brewst. (Pa.) 149; Dyer v. Branneck, 66 Mo. 391. Neither are the essentials of the contract different, where
the alliance of the parties was at first
illegal. It is manifest, therefore, that
a change in the character of the cohabitation, wrought by the fact of -marital
consent, must frequently be established
by circumstantial evidence, as the law
does not require that the means taken
to work the change should necessarily
be the subject of direct proof. The circumstances, however, must not only be
sufficient to create a presumption in
favor of marriage, but they must also
"be such as to exclude the inference or
presumption that the former relation
continued :" Foster v. Hawley, 8 Hun
(N. Y.) 68-72. Under ordinary zonditions, marriage will be presumed not
only from specific facts and circumstances (IIamilton v. Hamilton, 9 Cl. &
Fin. 327 ; Montague v. Montague, 2
Addams 375; Vincent's Appeal, 60
Penn. St. 228; s. c. De Amarelli's Estate, 2 Brewst. (Pa.) 239),but also from
a constant matrimonial cohabitation
and general reputation of marriage ;
(Yardley's Estate, 75 Penn. St. 207
Bicking's Appeal, 2 Brewst. (Pa.) 202 ;
Cuigile v. Wood, 63 Mo. 501 ; In the
matter of Taylor, 9 Paige 611), or as it
is sometimes termed, the habit and repute of marriage : Campbell v. Camps
bell, Law Rep. 1 H. L. Sc. 182 ; DeThoren v. Attorney-CGeneral, I Ap. Cas.
686.
This presumption, it, should perhaps
be noted, is nevertheless purely benevolent in its character: 2 Best on Ev.
624; 1 Taylor on Er. 140; 1 Bish. on
Mar. & Div. 434, and that marriage
will therefore not be inferred when such
a conclusion would tend to impute crime

rather than establish innocence : I Bish.
on Mar. & Die. , 444-6; Jackson v.
VanBuskirk, 18 Johns. 346 ; Clayton v.
Wardell, 4 N. Y. 230 ; s. c. 5 Barb.
214; Foster v. Hawley, 8 Hun 68;
Chamberlain v. Chamberlain, 71 N. Y.
423; Senser v. Bower, 1 Pa. 432:
Jones v. Jones, 45 Md. 144-57; Redgrave v. Bedgrave, 38 Id. 93 ; Weatherford v. Weatherford, 20 Ala. 548;
Houpt v. Houpt, 5 Ohio 539; s. c.
Wright 156; Pontney v. Fairhaven,
Brayton (Vt.) 185; Breakey v. Breakey, U. C. Q. B. 349-58; Wheeler v.
Mc lWilliams, Id. 77 ; Taylor v. Taylor,
I Lee 571; s.c.5 Eng. Eec. Rep. 454.
Thus in Foster v. Hawley, decided by
the New York Supreme Court, and
cited in the principal case ; a married
man consorted with a strange woman
for over twenty-four years, and she
bore him ten children ; at the expiration of this period, the husband obtained a divorce from his wife and continued to reside with the woman for
six months longer, when they separated
and each remarried. Under these circumstances, the court refused to presume that a contract of marriage had
been entered into, after the impediment
to marriage had been removed by the
divorce, and before the parties had separated and formed new matrimonial
relations.
"We cannot," said the court, "1raise
a presumption of a contract of marriage
where the direct consequence of so doing
would be to involve both parties to it in
the crime of bigamy." Itis intimated,
however, in the principal case, that there
must be " something more" than the
presumption deduced from cohabitation
and reputation, to rebut the presumption
arising from the illegal origin of the
relation, when the cohabitation and
reputation began at a time when there
could have been no marriage in fact.
This doctrine seems to be founded upon
the theory that the present repute and
conduct of the parties, must necessarily
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relate back to the time when such repute
was without foundation in fact, and
when the conduct of the parties was
admittedly fraudulent. It is manifest,
however, that, if such indeed be the law,
it is rendered very difficult, if not in
fact impossible, for parties to purge a
meretricious alliance of its illegal taint,
without the publication of their own
shame, and the declaration of their
childrens' infamy. It was therefore
said by Lord CHErSFORD, in De Tho.
ren v. Attorney-General, supra, that "if
the cohabitation begins in an illicit
intercourse, and is continued after the
bar to marriage (whatever it may be) is
known to be removed, habit and repute
may have their proper operation upon
the continuing cohabitation, which is
not to be referred to the original intercourse." (Page 694.) The conflicting
position taken in the principal case
would seem to be based upon the supposed necessity that the evidence should
not only inferentially establish the
fact of marriage, but also the specific
moment of time at which the parties
contracted to be husband and wife.
But in Campbell v. Campbell, which was
a well considered case, a wholly different view seems to have been taken.
Said Lord WESTBURY : "There is no
foundation for the argument that the
matrimonial consent must of necessity
be referred to the commencement of the
cohabitation, nor any warrant for the
appellant's ingenious argument that, as
the consent interchanged must be referred to some particular period, which he
insisted was at the commencement of
the cohabitation, and therefore insufficient, the cohabitation, which continued
afterwards without interruption, would
warrant no other conclusion than that
which would be warranted by the consent interchanged at a time when it
was insufficient. I should undoubtedly
oppose to that another, and, I think, a
sounder rule and principle of law,
namely, that you must infer the consent
VOL. XXVII.-81

to have been given at the first moment
when you find the parties able to enter
into the contract."
It, nevertheless, frequently happens,
when there was no impediment to the
marriage, and the cohabitation was at
first voluntarily illicit, that the time
of the change in the character of tho
relation can only be approximately
determined. Said the auditor in Physick's Estate, 4 Am. Law Reg. N. S.
418; "The exact date of a marriage
proved by testimony of this nature
cannot be accurately decided." See
also Canjolle v. Ferrie, 23 N. Y. 90;
a. C. 26 Barb. 177 ; Ferrie v. The
Public Administrator, 3 Bradf. (N. Y.)
151. If, however, there is no general
reputation of marriage, and the cohabitation was illicit in its origin, it
is clear that the allegation that the
marriage took place at a specific time,
and at a certain place, must be clearly
proved, in order to defeat the prima
facie presumption that the continued
cohabitation was not matrimonial : Cargile v. Wood, 63 Mo. 501 ; Barnum v.
Barnum, 42 Mfd. 251. It has also been
held that the inference in favor of marriage could not be drawn from cohabitation and reputation, where it was alleged
that the marriage took place at a definite
time and in a certain manner: Blackburn
v. Crawfords, 3 Wall. 175-194; Redgrave v. Redgrave, 38 Md. 93 ; Cram v.
Burnham, 5 Me. 214. This doctrine
however seems to have been questioned.
(See dissenting opinion of CLIFFORD,
J., in 3 Wall. 195 ; Bingham on Descents 458; and a contrary view is
expressed in Campbell v. Campbell, and
De Thoren v. Attorney-General. In
Campbell v. Campbell the wife was married, in the presence of a minister,
during the lifetime of her first husband,
to a man with whom she thereafter continuously cohabitated both before and
after her husband's death. Under these
circumstances Lord CRANWORTH said :
"Assuming such a ceremony to have
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been gone througn, the question still
remains behind, whether its existence
is sufficient to rebut what would, I
think, have been, if it had not existed,
the irresistible presumption of marriage
afforded by the rest of the evidence. I
think not. This bigamous marriage
ceremony did not prevent the parties to
i. from afterwards becoming husband
and wife, if they were minded so to
do." (P.
205.)
"In such circumstances," he continued, "we ought to
infer, after their deaths, that at some
time during the long period during
which they lived together, and in some
manner, however informal, they did that
which they could do without any difficulty, viz.. enter into an agreement to
be or become married persons, and so
to acquire for themselves and their
children the status which the evidence
satisfies me they wished to enjoy." (P.

206.)
It would therefore seem to be well
established as a general proposition,
that marriage may be inferred from
continuous cohabitation and uninterrupted repute, despite the conflicting
presumption that springs from the meretricious inception of the sexual relations: IVilkinson v. Payne, 4 Durnf. &
East 468; Fenton v. Reed, 4 Johns.
52 ; .Tackson v. Clarc, 18 Id. 346 ; Rose
v. Clark, 8 Paige 474 ; Physick's Estate, 4 Am. Law Reg. N. S. 418;
Hgde v. Hyde, 3 Brad. (N. Y.) 509 ;
Donnelly v. Donnelly, 8 B. Mon. 113-.
7; Dickerson v. Brown, 49 Miss. 357;
Floyd v. Calvert, 53 Miss. 37-46;
State v. Worthinghtim, 23 Minn. 528;
Blanchard v. Lambert, 43 Iowa 228;
Holt~ird v. Ins. Co., 12 Am. Law
Reg. N. S. 567; a. c. 2 Dill. C. C.
167 ; Jones v. .Toneq, 45 Md. 155 ;
North v. North, 1 Barb. Ch. 241-3.
It was said indeed in Physick's Estate,
that "in the event of such countervailing presumptions, that in favor of innocence must prevail."
Although this
presumption can only be overthrown

by "strong and cogent evidence to the
contrary :" DeThoren v. Attorney-General, supra, p. 690; yet it may be questioned whether it will necessarily prevail in every instance over the conflicting inference that the original status of
the parties remained unchanged. It is
not clear that any greater technical
force is to be given to this presumption
than is warranted by the evidence from
which it is derived : 0' Gara v. Eisenlohr, 38 N. Y. 296-304. It was therefore said by Lord CRANWORTH, that

"where a man and woman have lived
together as husband and wife, at a time
when they could not be husband and
wife, and where they continued to live
together in the same manner after it
has become possible for them to become
husband and wife, the question whether
they have become husband and wife, is
a question not of law but of fact. The
law permits them to create that relation
between themselves, and whether they
have done so, must be decided like any
other question of fact. The circumstance that they represented themselves
to be man and wife, when they knew
they were not so, may reasonably be
taken into account in estimating their
subsequent conduct. It may neutralize
the effect which would otherwise have
been properly given to their subsequent
cohabitation, that is, it may do so as
mlatter of fact; I cannot think that it
must do so as matter of law; and if
that be so, then all which any tribunal
can do which has to deal with such a
question is, to look to all the circumstances of the case, and consider
whether they do or do not lead to the
conclusion that the parties did contract
marriage at some time after it was possible for them to marry :" Campbell v.
Qtnipbell, supra, p. 201.
The rule thus laid down was illustrated by the recent case of the State v.
lWorthinyham, 23 Minn. 528. That was
a proceeding in bastardy, in which the
defendant pleaded that the woman was
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his wife. When the parties first cohab- be given to it, however, in this as in
ited, the man was married to another every other case, rests exclusively with
woman, but he subsequently obtained the jury in the exercise of its best judga divorce, and continued to reside with ment, under proper instructions from
the mother of the alleged bastard until the court." (P. 536-7.) Such proper
these proceedings were instituted. Un- instructions combining the two elements
der these circumstances, the supreme which were severally wanting in the
court held that the trial court erred in above and the principal case, was found
refusing to permit the defendant to in the words of TREAT, J., in his charge
prove by his alleged wife, "that dur- to the jury. in the case of 1Iolabird v.
ing all the time she lived and cohabited Atlantic Ins. Co., 12 Am. Law Reg. N.
with the defendant, and at the time the S. 566, where he said : "The attention
child was begotten, as charged in the of the jury is directed to the difference
complaint, she held herself out to her between a mere attempted recognition of
friends, neighbors and the world gener- a pest void marriage and a subsequent
ally, as the wife of the defendant; that expression of mutual and then present
the parties went to St. Paul and re- consent to be husband and wife. The
mained one night, and returned to Min- subsequent marriage may be proved by
neapolis, and then represented to the habit and repute, if the evidence thereof
world that they had been married ; that satisfies the jury that the parties had
the complaining witness thereafter as- mutually agreed to become husband and
sumed and went by the name of Wor- wife in good faith and cohabited there.h
thiugham. (P. 531.) "T e point is pre- after as such." (P. 568.)
See also, Rex v.Twining, 2 B. & A.d.
sented by counsel for the state," said
the court, " that no presumption of 386 ; Rex v. Harbone,2 Ad. & El. 540 ;
marriage can arise in this case from any Lapsley v. Grierson, 1 H. L. Cas. 498;
cohabitation of the parties occurring Greenboro' v. Underhill, 12 Vt. 604;
after the defendant's divorce, because Spears v. Burton, -31 Miss. 547-54;
I-ilkie v. Collins, 48 Id. 496-511 of its illicit character in the beginning.
An intercourse originally unlawful and Yates v. Houston, 3 Tex. 433 ; Best on
lustful from choice, undoubtedly raises Presump., 22 Law Lib. 4th series, p.
the presumption that its character re- *61 ; 1 Bish. on Mar. & Div., 456,
mains such during its continuance. where the presumption in favor of the
But this is a presumption, not of law innocence of a conjugal union was
but of fact, for the consideration of the brought in conflict with the ordinary prejury in connection with the particular sumption of the continuance of the life
facts and circumstances of the case. of a former wife or husband. Thus, in
In the case at bar, it appears that the the syllabus to Lapsley v. Grierson, sucohabitation between the parties had pra, it is stated that, "there is no absoits origin, in part at least, in a desire lute presumption of law as to the continfor marriage, and under a promise that uance of life, nor any absolute presumpsuch a relation should be assumed as tion against a party doing an act besoon as defendant could procure a di- cause the doing of it would make him
vorce from his then wife. This indi- guilty of an offence against the law.
cates that the parties regarded the In every instance the circumstances of
married state as one preferable to that the case must be considered." And in
of concubinage, and weakens some- Rex v. Harbone, DEN MM , 0. J., says,
what the force of the presumption ordi- "that nothing can he more absurd than
narily attaching to an original illicit the notion, that there is to be any rigid
cohabitation. The weight which is to presumption of law on such a question
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of fact, without reference to accompanying circumstances, such for instance, as
the age or health of the party." It
would therefore seem, that when the
circumstantial evidence in support of
marriage becomes confused by conflicting inferences, that it rests wholly with
the jury, unbiassed by any binding in-

struction from the court to weigh
against eac other the fundamental
facts from which the countervailing presumptions are deduced, and to strike
that balance which best accords with
the special circumstances of each indiTidual case.
J. P. B.

Supreme Court of Tennessee.
JACOB RENEGAR v. THOMAS C. THOMPSON.
If a creditor take a mortgage from the principal debtor on sufficient property to
secure his debt, and afterwards enter into a different agreement with such debtor
and abandon the mortgage, such acts will discharge the surety, who may make the
defence in a court of law and will not be compelled to resort to a bill in equity.

ON the 18th April 1873, James Mathews, with James Tatum
and Jacob Renegar as his sureties, executed his note to Thompson
for $300, due 25th December thereafter. On 25th November
1875, suit was brought. The defences of the security, Renegar,
were, First: That he had given to Thompson verbal notice to collect the note, &c.; second: that Thompson had taken a mortgage
from Mathews on a saw-mill, of the value of $2000 or $2500, to
secure said debt, and afterwards abandoned the mortgage and made
another and different arrangement with the principal, Mathews,
without the knowledge or consent of Renegar. These facts were
proven on the trial.

The opinion of the court was delivered by
TuiRNEY, J.-The verbal notice to sue was not a defence at law,
as the statute requires such notice to be given in writing and
proven by two witnesses. The circuit judge ruled that the taking
of the mortgage and its abandonment for "1another and different
arrangement," as the plaintiff was shown to have admitted, was no
defence to the action. This was error; the rule is, a creditor must,
in all transactions with the principal debtor, act with the most
perfect good faith toward sureties, for if he does any act injurious
to them or inconsistent with their rights, or omit to do any act,
which his duty to them requires, whereby they are injured, they will
be discharged from responsibility: Bond v. Ray, 5 Humph. 492.
We know of no case in our state in which this question has
arisen at law. ]:n the case of King v. Baldwin, 17 Johns. 384,
Chief Justice SPENcEpR said : "The principle adopted by this court
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in Bathbone v. Warren, that a surety will be discharged if a new
agreement be entered into between the creditor and the principal
debtor, varying or enlarging the time of performance of a contract,
although amply supported by cases decided in the English courts,
is of modern growth even in a court of equity, and it is well settled
now that this defence may be set up in equity." I do not, then,
perceive any solid objection to a court of law taking cognisance
of the matter forming the grounds of the appellant's relief, because
in such cases courts of equity have also jurisdiction. Much less do I
perceive the necessity of applying to a court of equity to compel a
creditor to do what equity and good conscience require of him."
If this duty exists and does bind the conscience of the creditor,
I cannot conceive why it may not be brought into exercise by an
act in pais, and without the intervention of a court of equity.
This reasoning applies in all its force to the case in hand.
If the acts and conduct of the creditor are of a sort to discharge
a surety, we know of no substantial reason why the surety may
not avail of them by proper pleas, to an action at law; why may
he not defend in the forum selected by the creditor, rather than be
compelled to resort to the jurisdictive powers of a court of equity
and then make a successful defence upon precisely the same facts
that would be elicited under proper pleadings at law ? If such was
ever the rule, it was hi'ghly technical and without the support of
reason, and should give way to the constant progress of improvement in our system of jurisprudence.
The matters of defence offered here, are plain and simple facts,
without the least complication, of easy comprehension by a jury,
and present no reasonable ground for exclusive equity jurisdiction
unless it be a pure technicality.
The facts claimed to effect the discharge of the surety are as
easy and intelligible as would be those under pleas of payment,
set-off, accord and satisfaction, arbitrament and award, or any of the
other pleas commonly pleaded in a court of law, and we can conceive of no reason for distinguishing between the case at law and
the cases instanced. The abandonment of the mortgage in consideration of another arrangement with the principal debtor, was
bad faith to the security whereby he was injured.'
Judgment reversed.
I See Gillespie v. Darwin, 6 Heisk. 21, and Lindsay v. C-ampion, I Baxter
466, to the same effect.

